Wednesday, June 9, 2021

Time frame within which a complaint can be filed

 

1.3-4 Time frame within which a complaint can be filed - Section 24A of the Act provides that a consumer dispute can be filed within two years from the date on which the cause of action arises.

Since this provision was inserted in the Act in 1993, before that the Consumer Forums were following the Limitation Act, 1963, which says that a suit can be filed within three years after the cause of action arises.

The point of time when cause of action arises is an important factor in determining the time period available to file a com­plaint. There are no set rules to decide such time. It depends on the facts and circumstances of each case.

Examples :

     1.   A got his eye operated by B in 1989. He got a certifi­cate of blindness on 18th December, 1989. He was still in hope of gaining his sight and went from second operation in 1992 and was discharged on 21-1-1992. He filed a complaint against B on 11-1-1994. B opposed on the ground that more than 2 years were over after 18-12-1989, thus the complaint is not maintainable. The Commission held that here the cause of action for filing the complaint would arose after the second operation when A lost entire hope of recovery. Thus the suit is maintainable - Mukund Lal Ganguly v. Dr. Abhijit Ghosh III 1995 CPJ 64.

     2.   A house was allotted on 1-1-1999. Defects appeared in the house on 10-1-1999. Here the cause of action will arise on 10-1-1999.

It may be noted that these time frames are not absolute limita­tions. If the Consumer Forum is satisfied that there was suffi­cient cause for not filing the complaint within the prescribed period, it can entertain a complaint beyond limitation time. However the Forum must record the reasons for condonation of delay.

Example : A deposited some jewellery with a bank. Bank lost it. Bank kept giving her false sense of hope to retrieve the jewel­lery, and thus A was put in a state of inaction. Later on when A filed a suit on the Bank, it claimed that the suit was not main­tainable as the limitation time after the cause of action arose has lapsed. The Commission reprimanded the bank and admitted the case - Agnes D’Mello v. Canara Bank [1992] I CPJ 335 (NCDRC).

 

possession take without protest ncdrc

 

NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION

NEW DELHI

 

FIRST APPEAL NO. 472 OF 2007

(From the orders dated 10.04.2007 in Complaint No.37/2000 of the Delhi State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission)

 

B.S. Walia

R/o 338, Kailash Tower-I

East of Kailash

New Delhi-110065                                           Appellant

 

Versus

 

M/s DLF Universal Limited

DLF Centre

Sansad Marg

New Delhi-110001                                           Respondent

 

BEFORE :

        HON’BLE  MR. JUSTICE  D.K. JAIN,  PRESIDENT

        HON’BLE  MRS.  VINEETA  RAI,  MEMBER

 

For the Appellant       :       Mr. B.S. Walia, Appellant in person

For the Respondent    :       Mr. R. Narain, Advocate with

Ms. Kanika, Advocate &

Mr. Siddharth Banthia, Advocate

 

Pronounced : 27th November, 2013

 

O R D E R

 

PER VINEETA RAI

 

        First Appeal No. 472 of 2007 has been filed by Shri B.S. Walia, Appellant herein and Original Complainant before the Delhi State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (hereinafter referred to as the State Commission) being aggrieved by the order of that Commission which while concluding that there was a breach of Agreement by M/s DLF Universal Limited, Respondent herein and Opposite Party before the State Commission, had awarded a compensation of only Rs.50,000/- which was far less than what was sought by the Appellant and warranted in the case.

2.     The facts as contended by the Appellant are that in June, 1993 he had booked a flat in Beverly Park (II) in DLF Qutub Enclave, Gurgaon with the Respondent after being assured that this flat was immediately below the penthouse.  Appellant thereafter made the entire payment of Rs.24,55,182/- as per the prescribed schedule in the Agreement, including miscellaneous charges.  However, he was “wonderstruck” when he was informed on 24.09.1997 that the Respondent had suo motu and arbitrarily changed the allotment of this flat to one storey below the agreed floor as a result of which it was not immediately below the penthouse as applied for by the Appellant and confirmed by the Respondent.  This clearly amounted to unfair trade practice.  Further, as per Agreement the Respondent was to deliver the flat after three years but instead of handing over the completed flat by the stipulated period, Respondent demanded escalation costs of Rs.4,29,595/-, which the Appellant had no option but to pay under duress whereas Respondent should have paid interest on the amount of over Rs.24,00,000/- already deposited by the Appellant for the delayed period.  Respondent was, therefore, guilty of deficiency in service on this count and liable for payment of interest @ 16.5% on this amount for the delayed period in handing over possession of the flat amounting to Rs.10,78,080/- since the flat was handed over only on 18.06.1999.  Being aggrieved by the unfair trade practice and deficiency in service on the part of Respondent, Appellant filed a complaint before the State Commission seeking (i) damages of Rs.5,00,000/-; (ii) interest for the delay in handing over possession from July, 1996 to February, 1999 amounting to Rs.9,09,600/-; and (iii) compensation of Rs.2,00,000/- towards mental agony and harassment.

3.     Respondent on being served filed a written rejoinder denying the allegations made by the Appellant and inter alia contented that the allegation of unfair trade practice in not allotting the flat as per the requirements of the Appellant is not borne out by the documentary evidence on record.  Appellant himself had written a letter on 23.06.1993 to the Respondent stating that a flat be reserved for him on the 10th floor or if it is possible on the 11th or 12th floor.  Subsequently in his formal application for allotment, he again specifically indicated that the flat No.1410-A on the 10th floor was acceptable to him and it was also confirmed in the Apartment Buyer’s Agreement signed between the parties.  There was never any request written or otherwise by the Appellant that he should be allotted a flat just below the penthouse. In fact Respondent vide letters dated 26.06.1993, 24.09.1997, 19.12.1997, 10.07.1997, 09.09.1997 and 04.08.1999 had clearly communicated to the Appellant that flat no. 1410-A had two floors above it, including the penthouse on the top floor.   Regarding the allegation of the Appellant that he was not liable to pay escalation costs because of the delay in handing over possession of the flat, for which Respondent solely was to blame, it was clearly stated in the Apartment Buyer’s Agreement that delay could be possible on account of various factors beyond the control of the Respondent and in the instant case the delay in handing over possession occurred because of time taken in getting necessary government clearances.  The escalation charges demanded by the Respondent were thus strictly in accordance with the terms of the Agreement and in fact no promise about any particular date for handing over the flat was made. Appellant took possession of flat no. 1410-A on 18.06.1999 and also sold the same.  Having done so, as per clause 20 of the Agreement, he had no claim against the Respondent for any reason whatsoever and, therefore, the present complaint filed by him was no longer maintainable.    

4.     The State Commission after hearing the parties and on the basis of evidence produced before it observed as follows :

8.    After hearing the counsel for the parties and according careful consideration to the documents on record as well as the version of the O.P. reproduced from the written submission of the O.P., we find that the O.P. had vide letter dated 10-07-1993 admitted the allotment of a floor which was required by the complainant, i.e. immediately below the penthouse. However, the O.P. is harping on the number of flat without realizing that it had already agreed to allot a flat below the penthouse to the complainant. Confusion is being created by the O.P. regarding the number of the flat. Thus, if the complainant has suffered any loss, it was on account of non-allotment of flat immediately below the penthouse but subsequently he was allotted the flat and it was sold also. …

 

11.     Taking over all view of the matter and the breach of agreement by O.P., we deem that a lump sum compensation of Rs. 50,000/- would meet the ends of justice.”

 

        Hence, the present appeal.

5.     Appellant in person and Counsel for the Respondent made oral submissions.

6.     Appellant vehemently argued that the State Commission erred in granting him a token compensation after having concluded that there was a clear breach of the Agreement.  Appellant brought to our attention a letter dated 05.08.1999 in which Respondent had admitted that there appeared to be some misunderstanding vis-à-vis numbering of the flats as communicated to the Appellant vide Respondent’s letter dated 10.07.1993 indicating that there was no intervening floor between the flat allotted to Appellant and the penthouse.  Appellant contended that he had opted for flat no. 1410-A on the clear understanding that there was only the penthouse above his flat.  He had clarified the same in writing to the Respondent on 16.07.1997 and also alleged that it appeared that the building plans were arbitrarily changed and one more floor was constructed between his flat and the penthouse.  Since Appellant was working abroad he was not in a position to meet the Respondent frequently as a result of which he was misled and the sale of the flat was foisted on him.  Appellant wanted to buy the flat for his personal use and he had no option but to sell it because it was not as per his requirement.  Appellant, therefore, requested that the order of the State Commission be modified and he be given the compensation and relief sought by him before the State Commission.

7.     Counsel for Respondent denied the above allegations and stated that even Rs.50,000/- given to the Appellant by the State Commission as compensation was not based on the merits of the case but Respondent paid this amount to avoid unnecessary litigation.  More importantly Appellant had accepted the decree of the State Commission without any reservations and, therefore, the present appeal for enhancement of compensation is untenable.  It was reiterated that the Appellant without any reservation had taken possession of the flat in question on 18.06.1999 and having done so as per the Apartment Buyer’s Agreement he had no claim against the Respondent for any reason whatsoever.  On merits, it was contended that Appellant after booking the flat had never indicated that he wanted only a flat on a floor just below the penthouse.  In this connection, Counsel for the Respondent brought to our notice the letter dated 23.06.1993 from the Appellant to the Respondent requesting that “you reserve a flat for me in your building Windsor on the 10th floor or if it is possible on the 11th or 12th floor”.  From this letter it is very clear that Appellant had made a specific request for allotment on the 10th floor and reference to the higher floors was made only as an alternative.  Regarding the allegation that there was delay in handing over possession of the flat and also that the escalation charges were unwarranted, Counsel for the Respondent reiterated that these were covered under various provisions in the Apartment Buyer’s Agreement entered into between the parties and, thus, binding on the Appellant.  In view of these facts, the present appeal having no merit deserves to be dismissed. 

8.     We have carefully considered the submissions made by the parties and have also gone through the evidence on record.  Appellant having booked a flat in Beverly Park (II) in DLF Qutub Enclave, Gurgaon with the Respondent is not in dispute.  It is also a fact that Appellant had signed the Apartment Buyer’s Agreement accepting allotment of flat no. 1410-A on the 10th floor and had consequently paid for the cost of the flat.  The main point in dispute leading to filing of the present consumer complaint is that the Respondent had misled the Appellant that the flat allotted to him was just one floor below the penthouse whereas the Appellant after having accepted the flat and signed the Apartment Buyer’s Agreement came to know only on 24.09.1997 that the Respondent had suo motu and arbitrarily built two floors above the flat allotted to him, as a result of which it was not immediately below the penthouse, as applied for by the Appellant.  Apart from this, Appellant has challenged the delay in handing over the flat and the consequent escalation charges as not being warranted.   

        After going through the evidence on record, we are unable to accept the above contentions of the Appellant.  In this connection, we note that vide letter dated 23.06.1993 written by Appellant to Respondent following discussions in the latter’s office, Appellant had requested that he be reserved a flat on the 10th floor or if it is possible on the 11th or 12 floors.  From this letter, it is obvious that the Appellant was fully aware before having entered into the Apartment Buyer’s Agreement that there were two floors above the 10th floor i.e. the 11th and 12th floors.  Subsequently, in the application for allotment Appellant himself had specifically sought allotment on the 10th floor with no condition that it should be just below the penthouse.  Some confusion regarding whether the flat was located on the 10th floor or the 11th floor may have arisen, as observed by the State Commission, because of a letter from the Respondent dated 10.07.1993, in which Respondent had stated that the building has ground floor + 10 floors and, therefore, flat no. 1410-A is actually on the 11th floor but this error was subsequently clarified in various letters written by Respondent to Appellant.  Also in the Apartment Buyer’s Agreement entered into between the parties on 05.01.1994  it was clearly stated that flat no. 1410-A was on the 10th floor.  Further, as stated earlier, there is no evidence written or otherwise that the Appellant had insisted at the time of his purchasing the flat that only a flat below the penthouse would be acceptable to him.  It was only in 1997 when the construction was almost completed that this issue was raised.  Appellant thereafter took possession of the flat without any protest in 1999 and also sold the same, which lends further credence to the Respondent’s contention that Appellant had no initial objection to the location of the flat on the 10th floor irrespective of whether it was one or two floors below the penthouse and this objection was only voiced in 1997 i.e. three years after he had signed the Apartment Buyer’s Agreement. 

        Regarding the delay in handing over the possession of the flat and consequent escalation charges levied by the Respondent and objected to by the Appellant, we note that there are provisions pertaining to these possibilities under clauses 15, 16 and 17 of the Apartment Buyer’s Agreement entered into between the parties and, therefore, we do not find the Respondent guilty of any deficiency in service on this count as well.

9.     Keeping in view the above facts, we are unable to accept the present appeal and dismiss the same with no order as to costs.   

 

 

Sd/-

                                                                          (D.K. JAIN, J.)

PRESIDENT

 

 

Sd/-

(VINEETA  RAI)

MEMBER

 

Mukesh         

 

Judgment on continuing cause of action NCDRC

 

NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION

NEW DELHI

 

FIRST APPEAL NO. 254 OF 2013

(Against the order dated 14.02.2013 in S.C. Case No.CC/94/2010  of the State Commission, West Bengal)

 

 

 

M/s. Vivekanand Construction Company

At Phase -4, Block-6, 493/C/A,

G.T. Road (South),

Howrah -2 West Bengal                                                                                                                                                      ……….Appellant

                                                                            

Versus

 

1. Suraj Ratan Mundra

At Flat No.303 C, Block- Back (rare)

At Devangan Apartment, 176, Bidhan Sarani,

Kolkata- 700 006

 

2. Kailash Undra

At Flat No.303 C, Block-Back (rare)

At Devangan Apartment 176, Bidhan Sarani,

Kolkata- 700 006.                                                                                                                                                                 .........Respondents

 

 

 

BEFORE

HON’BLE MR. VINAY KUMAR, PRESIDING MEMBER

 

 

For the Appellant         :   Mr.Dipak Kr. Jena & Mr. Yatharth Nautiyal

                                         Advocates

 

 

 

 

 

PRONOUNCED ON:  17 May 2013

 

 

ORDER

 

 

PER MR.VINAY KUMAR, PRESIDING MEMBER

This appeal is filed against the order of West Bengal State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission in CC/94/2010 in which complaint of the present respondents has been allowed. 

2.      The case of the Complainants is that they have purchased a flat from the Appellant /OP and were put in possession of the same in 1999.  But, despite payment of full agreed price and repeated reminders, the OP did not register the sale deed in their favour, until the filing the complaint on 13.12.2010.  In this background the State Commission, in its order of 14.2.2013, has directed the appellant/OP to execute and register the deed of conveyance within 45 days.  The Commission has also awarded compensation of Rs.3 lakhs.

3.      De hors the claim of the complainants, the plea of the Appellant /OP before the State Commission was that-

“the opp. Party completed the flat and issued possession letter on 21.04.99 and requested the opp. Party for registration of the documents but the petitioner was not interested to register the documents for the purpose of squeezing money from the Opp. Party.  It is submitted that the Opp. Party requested the petitioner for making arrangement for registration and paying cost of registration including stamp duty and other requires so that the Opp. Party can execute the documents before the Calcutta Registration office but the petitioner did not pay any heed to it nor given any response.”  The State Commission did not accept this plea and held that-    “There is practically no tangible answer on the part of the OP as to what caused such abnormal delay in execution and registration of the deed in question, which, in our opinion, tantamounts to deficiency in service”

 

4.      We have carefully perused the records of the appeal and heard Mr. Dipak Kumar Jena, Advocate on behalf of the appellant.

5.      As is evident from the record, the flat had not been registered in the name of the Complainants for almost 10 years from the date of possession till 13.12.2012, when the jurisdiction of the State Commission was invoked. The observation of the State Commission that there was no answer on the part of the OP as to what caused this abnormal delay in execution of the deed of conveyance was put to the appellant counsel.  Learned counsel admitted that no documentary evidence in this behalf had been placed before the State Commission.  Only oral submissions had been made to the effect that the efforts made by the Appellant/OP to get the sale deed registered were frustrated by non-cooperation of the respondent/Complainant. It is therefore, clear that no evidence of any value was adduced before the State Commission in support this contention.

6.      The appeal petition, as well as the arguments of the counsel for the appellant, have both laid considerable stress on the fact that the consumer complaint was filed nearly 10 years after the admitted date of possession of the flat. It is argued that if the cause of action arose on 21.4.1999, i.e. the date of possession, the complaint would become inadmissible on the ground of delay.  On this point, the case of the Complaints, as seen from para 13 of the complaint before the State Commission was that:-

“That the cause of action of this case arose on 21.04.1999 being the date of giving possession of the flat in question by the opposite party and further on 16.05.2008 being the date of issuance of first legal notice through S.G. Muskara and then on 17,09,2010 being the date of last legal notice through Barun Prasad, advocate and denial to execute the deed of conveyance of the flat by the opposite party the same is continuing till date.”

 

The only response to this in the pleadings of the appellant/OP before the State Commission was a bland denial that the cause of action arose on 21.4.1999 and that it arose again on subsequent dates of legal notices. 

7.      Learned counsel for the appellant has sought to rely upon the decision in Haryana Urban Development Authority Vs. B.K., Sood, (2006) 1 SCC 164.  In this matter, the complaint before the State Commission was filed 10 years after taking possession of the bhattis and 8 years after the cause for alleged damage had commenced. But, there was not even a prayer to condone the delay.  Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that the National Commission had proceeded on an incorrect factual basis that the bhattis had been removed during the pendency of the appeal before it.  This finding was held to be contrary to the records as the offending bhattis had already been removed, three years before the consumer complaint was filed. 

8.      On comparison, facts of the present case are found to be very different.  The case of the Complainants, as already observed, was that the cause of action began with the possession of the flat in 1999 and continued till the filing of the complaint, due to non-registration of the conveyance deed for the same.  Therefore, in my view the decision relied upon by the appellant will not come to his rescue.  Moreover, the plea of continuing cause of action was not challenged before the State Commission.

9.      In Lata Construction and others Vs. Dr.Rameshchandra Ramniklal Shah and another, (2000) 1 SCC 586, the question of ‘continuing cause of action’ arose directly for consideration before the Supreme Court of India.  The case of the Complainant was that under a written agreement of 27.1.1987 the builder-developer had promised to provide a flat but had failed to do so.  This agreement contemplated that Lata Construction would construct and hand over a flat on the ground floor.  This was not done.  However, the two sides entered into a fresh agreement on 23.2.1991 in which the builder agreed to pay the Complainant Rs.9.51 lakhs in lieu of the flat.  Hon’ble Suprme Court held that:-

4.     A perusal of the agreement dated 23-2-1991 would show that it was specifically stipulated therein that the rights under the agreement dated 27-1-1987 would remain unaffected.  It was for this reason that in the claim petition filed before the Commission, it was clearly mentioned that their rights under the agreement dated 27-1-1987 as also those under the agreement dated 23-2-1991 may be enforced.  It was also specifically mentioned in the second agreement that the first agreement of 1987 would be treated as terminated only on fully payment of the stipulated amount of Rs.9,51,000 to the respondents.  Since the rights under the agreement of 1987 had not been given up and the appellants were constantly under an obligation to provide a flat to the respondents and deliver possession thereof to them, the Commission rightly treated “cause of action” to be a “continuing cause of action” and came to the right conclusion that the claim was not beyond time.”

 

10.    The law laid down above on continuing cause if action, applies equally to the present case. The sale of the flat to the respondent/ complainant, receipt of the agreed price by the vendor/appellant and physical delivery of the flat by the vendor/OP to the purchaser/Complainant, are facts established on the record. While the appellant has failed to prove that the respondent was responsible for the delay, non execution of the conveyance deed remains an admitted fact. More than anyone else, the appellant, being a construction company, should know that sale of a flat is completed with registration of the sale deed and not with mere transfer of physical possession. Clearly, the cause of action, which began with delivery of physical possession, continues till the deed of conveyance is registered. Therefore, the question of limitation does not arise.

11.    In the above background, I find no substance in the grounds of appeal against the impugned order. The appeal is therefore dismissed and the order of the West Bengal State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission in Consumer Complaint No CC/94/2010 is confirmed. No orders as to costs.

 

           

.……………Sd/-……………

(VINAY KUMAR)

PRESIDING MEMBER

 

s./-